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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Charles Sheldton Coleman appeals from the denial of his Rule 35 motions
for reconsideration of his sentences. He challenges the denial of those motions
and the denial of motions for appointment of counsel to pursue those motions.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Coleman was convicted of robbery, for which he was sentenced to serve
30 years with 6.5 years determinate (R., pp. 231-37); unlawful exercise of
functions of a police officer, for which he was sentenced to serve five years with
two years determinate, concurrent with the robbery (R., pp. 100-102); and battery
on a sheriff, for which he was ordered to serve a sentence of five years with six
months determinate, consecutive to the robbery (R., pp. 334-336). He moved for
reduction of his sentences. (R., pp. 104-10, 239-45, 338-44.) The district court
denied the motions.

(R., pp. 125-27, 260-62, 338.)

Coleman applied for

appointment of counsel on the Rule 35 motions. (R., pp. 113-15, 248-50, 34749.)

The district court denied his applications.

(R., p. 359. 1)

Coleman filed

notices of appeal timely only from the denial of his Rule 35 motions.

(R., pp.

129-31, 264-66, 360-62.)
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Coleman claims that the district court "did not address" his requests for counsel
· in two of the three pending dockets. (Appellant's brief, p. 7.) The state notes
that the district court's order denying counsel bears all three district court case
numbers. (R., p. 359.)
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ISSUES
Coleman states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it failed to address Mr.
Coleman's request for counsel to assist him with his Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 motion?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Coleman's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence in light of his progress during post-judgment
incarceration?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Coleman failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
denying Coleman's request for counsel?

2.

Has Coleman failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motions for reconsideration of his sentences?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Coleman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying Coleman's Request For Counsel
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Coleman's applications for appointment of

counsel on the Rule 35 motions. (R., p. 359.) Coleman contends the district
court erred, contending that "an indigent defendant need only provide new or
additional information in order to qualify for the appointment of counsel pursuant
to I.C. § 19-852(b)(3)." (Appellant's brief, p. 5.)

Coleman's claim of error is

without legal or factual support; he has therefore failed to show an abuse of
discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Denial of court appointed counsel under LC. § 19-852(b)(3) is "within the

court's discretion" as long as "the court appropriately finds that the claims
presented are frivolous."

Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69, 926 P.2d

1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App. 1996) (addressing a post-conviction proceeding and not
a Rule 35 motion). But

State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct.

App. 1994) (applying free review to whether the district court erred by denying
the Rule 35 motion prior to ruling on the motion for court appointed counsel).

C.

Coleman Has Failed To Show Error In The Implied Finding That The Rule
35 Motions Were Frivolous
A criminal defendant has the statutory right to counsel at all stages of the

criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion. Murray v. State, 121
3

Idaho 918, 923 n.3, 828 P.2d 1323, 1328 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992).

However, the

court may deny appointment of counsel if the Rule 35 motion is frivolous or one
that a reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing to bring at
his or her own expense.

I.C. § 19-852(b)(3).

A determination of whether a

motion for reduction of sentence is frivolous for purposes of applying I.C. § 19852(b)(3) is based on the contents of the motion itself and any accompanying
documentation that may support the motion. Wade, 125 Idaho at 525, 873 P.2d
at 170. Thus, a district court is within its discretion to deny a request for court
appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) if that district court appropriately
finds that the claims presented are frivolous after reviewing the contents of the
motion. Swisher, 129 Idaho at468-69, 926 P.2d at 1315-16.
In this case the district court found that Coleman had "committed a series
of robberies that threatened the community and threatened bank employees."
(R., p. 126.) The sentence the court imposed was, it found, reasonable under
the circumstances and consistent with applicable law.

(R., pp. 126-27.)

Although the district court did not make a specific finding that the motion was
frivolous, such a finding is implicit in the denial of counsel and the stated bases
for denial of the Rule 35 motion. See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726
P.2d 735, 737 (1986) (implicit findings of trial court should be overturned only if
unsupported by evidence); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641,
644 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[A]ny implicit findings of the trial court supported by
substantial evidence should be given due deference.").
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The record in this case shows that Coleman robbed a bank and that he
had attempted to learn security information about another bank by physically
threatening a bank teller then posing over the phone as a police officer
investigating the attack to get information about the bank from her. (PSI, p. 2.)
These, and the battery on a sheriff for shoving a deputy in the jail, were
Coleman's third, fourth and fifth felonies. (PSI, p. 6.) The judge considered the
nature of the crimes and Coleman's character extensively in sentencing.
(Sentencing Tr., p. 23, L. 14 - p. 30, L. 9.)
The motions were based on Coleman's claims, unsupported by any
evidence, that he was learning a new language, "being a model inmate," had
done "an heroic act by helping a fellow inmate who was choking during chow
period," and was "working as a barber." (R., p. 240.) He attached a resume, an
associate degree diploma from the High-Tech Institute, and a high school
diploma.

(R., pp. 242-45.)

The record, however, already contained the

information evidenced by the attachments. (PSI, pp. 9-10 (indicating high school
graduation and a "B.S." degree and setting forth Coleman's employment
history).) Thus, the only arguably new information in the motion was Coleman's
self-serving claims he was learning a new language, was a model prisoner,
helped a choking inmate, and was working as a barber. None of this information
had any chance of convincing the district court that the sentences should be
reduced.

(R., pp. 260-62.)

The record supports the implicit finding that the

motions were frivolous.
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Coleman argues that any motion for reconsideration of sentence that
contains any "new or additional information" is inherently not frivolous.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-7.)

He cites no authority actually applying such a

standard. The state submits that because every and any defendant can submit
information about his performance in prison or jail or on probation in the first 120
days after entry of judgment, Coleman's suggested standard is unworkable.
While Coleman's efforts to improve his situation and follow the prison rules in the
two months following entry of judgment are laudable, if true, they hardly rise to
the level of showing the need for counsel at state expense.
Coleman next argues that the district court had a duty to inform him of any
"perceived deficiency" in his motion prior to dismissal or denial of counsel, citing
authority interpreting the statutory notice requirements before summary dismissal
of a post-conviction petition. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Because Coleman was not
statutorily entitled to 20 days notice before the court denied his Rule 35 motion,
this argument on appeal is, like the Rule 35 motions themselves, frivolous.
The only new information Coleman presented to the district court was in
regard to his actions in prison following entry of judgment. Although it is good
that Coleman (allegedly) was being a model prisoner, learning a new language,
and working as a barber, and had helped a choking fellow-inmate, in light of the
nature of the crimes he committed and his past record such claims by Coleman
did not rise to the level of showing the motion was not frivolous for purposes of
appointing counsel at government expense.
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11.
Coleman Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His Rule 35 Motions For Reconsideration Of His Sentences
A.

Introduction
The district court, after considering both the aggravating circumstances

and the mitigating evidence, gave Coleman a relatively short fixed period of
incarceration to provide him with the best opportunity at rehabilitation and parole.
(Sentencing Tr., p. 23, L. 20 - p. 29, L. 19.) Coleman argues that the information
provided by his Rule 35 motions was mitigating because it demonstrated
potential employment skills and good character and, taken in context with the
evidence before the court at sentencing, demonstrated that the sentences were
excessive. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-14.) Review of the record, however, shows
that the motions contained little, if any, actually new information and what
information was provided was entirely consistent with the evidence already
considered and merely reinforced the district court's sentencing rationale.

B.

Standard Of Review
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203,
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Coleman must "show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion."

7

kt

C.

Coleman Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion In Light Of The
Marginal New Information Provided In His Rule 35 Motions
Coleman has failed to satisfy his burden of showing an abuse of discretion

in light of the information provided by his Rule 35 motion. The record shows that
Coleman robbed a bank when he entered and presented a note demanding
money and threatening to kill the teller.

(PSI, pp. 2, 90-91, 103.) About two

months later he intimidated a bank teller then posed as a police officer
investigating the very crime he committed in order to try and obtain information
about the bank where the teller worked. (PSI, p. 2.) After his arrest he battered
two jailers by shoving them instead of obeying orders to get off the phone and
return to his cell. (PSI, p. 163.) His crimes had significant adverse affects on his
victims. (PSI, pp. 3-5.) He committed his first felony in 2001, his second in 2007,
and his third, fourth and fifth in this case in 2009 and 2010. (PSI, pp. 5-6.)
The district court considered the seriousness of the offenses. (Sentencing
Tr., p. 23, L. 20 - p. 25, L. 24.) It considered as mitigating Coleman's education
and employment talents. (Sentencing Tr., p. 25, L. 25 - p. 26, L. 4.) The court
rejected the idea that drug use was truly mitigating in the crimes, given the
amount of planning and thought that went into them. (Sentencing Tr., p. 26, L. 4
- p. 27, L. 8.)

The court encouraged Coleman to make the most of his

opportunities, and that if he was serious about changing his life he would be
paroled while he was still young. (Sentencing Tr., p. 27, L. 16 - p. 28, L. 14.)
The court then imposed cumulative sentences amounting to seven years
determinate, with 29 years indeterminate. (Sentencing Tr., p. 28, L. 15 - p. 29,
L. 19.)
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Coleman committed serious crimes. His record indicates he is not new to
the criminal milieu.

The trial court obviously gave considerable weight to the

mitigating information as it noted it was giving a relatively short fixed portion with
the idea that Coleman would be able to get out of prison on parole if he applied
himself to his rehabilitation.
The information provided in the Ru le 35 motion, even taken as true, does
not change the court's analysis one bit. (See R., pp. 261-62.) Coleman argues
that his educational and employment history in his motion are "additional"
information because they "substantiated his prior assertions." (Appellant's brief,
p. 11.) Even assuming "substantiation" of previously provided evidence is "new
information," the diplomas and resume do not change the district court's analysis
at all. For example, Coleman's claim of a "B.S" degree is downgraded by the
diploma to an associate's degree. (Compare R., p. 244 with PSI, p. 9.) Likewise,
his employment history changed from jobs at AT&T and Hewlett Packard as
reported in the PSI to jobs at AT&T and IBM according to the resume. (Compare
R., pp. 242-43 with PSI, pp. 9-10.) Even assuming that confusing a bachelor's
degree with an associate's degree and interchanging HP with IBM as his former
employer were merely innocent mistakes rather than evidence of fabrication,
such "corrections" to the information he had previously provided hardly put
Coleman in any better light than he was at sentencing.
Likewise, his claims that in prison he was learning a language, obeying
the rules, working as a barber, and had even helped a fellow inmate when he
was choking really do not change the balance of community protection,
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deterrence, and rehabilitation from that employed by the district court. It is clear
that the court fashioned its sentences specifically so Coleman could demonstrate
himself a good prospect for a relatively early parole. That Coleman is doing well
in the initial weeks of his incarceration merely confirms the district court's
decision was not a bad one.
Coleman has failed to show any abuse of discretion. The district court
had already given significant weight to the mitigating evidence and determined to
impose a relatively short determinate period in order to give Coleman the best
opportunity for an early parole. Coleman's motion merely reconfirmed what the
district court had already done. Rather than show the sentences excessive the
new information merely showed the sentences to have been appropriate.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
denials of Coleman's motions for reconsideration of the sentences.

DATED this 9th day of December,
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011.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
r HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of December 2011, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

KKJ/pm
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